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The September 11 terrorist attacks on our nation pro-
duced horrendous loss of life and extraordinary grief
and pain. Provision for the safety and security of our
people and nation has now become paramount,and this
has created a new policy environment in the United
States and across the world. However, we must not 
let these security concerns eclipse the need for sound 
economic policies, both domestic and international. In
the long term, the health of our economy will largely
determine the well being of our society, including our capacity to 
provide safety and security.
In 1942, as the country mobilized for World War II at another time
of national crisis, the Committee for Economic Development (CED)
was formed to strengthen the relationship between business and gov-
ernment in the war effort and to develop principles for postwar recov-
ery. 1 In this same spirit, we offer the principles outlined below as a
broad framework for economic policy.
FIVE BROAD PRINCIPLES FOR POLICY
1. Develop Short-Term Policies Within A Sound Long-
Term Framework. We are now entering a period of great economic
uncertainty that may require significant short-term fiscal stimulus.We
still face long-term economic problems, however, which are different
in nature and which require very different solutions.We must imple-
ment short-term policies without compromising the nation’s long-term
economic strength. Otherwise, both short and long-term objectives
may be undermined, as discussed below.
2. Define Priorities Sharply. Larger national security require-
ments will constrain the economic and fiscal resources available for
other purposes.We must resist the facile notion that budget con-
straints are no longer operative and “anything goes” because we are in
a new policy environment. Quite the opposite is true; reconciling large
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1. Karl Schriftgiesser, Business and Public Policy (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall,
Inc.), 1963, p. 1.
immediate public needs with private consumption and investment will
require more stringent discipline.This is no time to indulge special-
interest or government-agency wish lists or partisan policy agendas.
Instead, we must take advantage of this crisis-induced opportunity for
bipartisanship to carefully define the nation’s priorities, both military
and domestic.
3. Do Not Abandon Critical Domestic and International
Goals. The necessarily increased attention to our security goals must
not lead us to abandon other critical long-term objectives. First, the
lines between security and non-security sectors and issues have
become less distinct.Transportation, communications, energy, financial
services, private and public health, education and training, and interna-
tional trade and economic assistance (to name only a few areas) will
present new challenges involving our long-term security. Structural
changes will be needed, for example, to increase our transportation
options and reduce our vulnerability to oil shortages. Second, how we
deal with these “non-security” objectives will define the kind of society
we have in the future.To take but one example, we believe it would be
tragic if welfare reform were to fail because we provided inadequate
resources to vulnerable families as the labor market weakens, state rev-
enues drop, and time limits constrain program eligibility. 2
4. Be Flexible. There is currently enormous uncertainty with
respect to the security threat, our future security requirements, and
likely changes in the economy. It is therefore essential that policies be
3
2. The importance of maintaining and increasing federal and state support for welfare-
to-work is discussed in CED’s Welfare Reform and Beyond: Making Work Work (2000),
Chapter 3.
flexible so that they can be modified as necessary when conditions
change.The federal government should be prepared to protect and
enhance our critical economic and public safety infrastructure, even if
this requires unusual and interventionist actions by peacetime stan-
dards.We believe the assistance provided to the airlines is justified on
these grounds. 3 In addition, this temporary assistance will help pre-
serve competition in the industry by averting consolidation under dis-
tressed conditions.
5. Rely on A Strengthened Safety Net, Not Industry
Subsidies. We recognize that the immediate shock of economic dis-
ruption has affected many individuals, firms, and industries and that a
weaker economy will produce hardship in the next few months.As
noted, we support direct emergency assistance to industries and firms
where the survival of our infrastructure networks is at stake. But we
should not provide such subsidies more generally—a policy that would
immediately raise impossible questions of equal treatment and quickly
undermine the efficiency of our market economy. Instead, existing safe-
ty net programs, such as unemployment compensation, should be
extended and strengthened to address the risk of greatly increased
economic hardship in coming months. 4
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3. However, we also urge that the provisions in the legislation that would allow U.S.
taxpayers to share in future airline profits be vigorously pursued.The legislation authorizes
a new Air Transportation Stabilization Board to enter into contracts providing that the gov-
ernment participate in future financial gains of participating companies through warrants,
stock options, or other equity instruments.This policy was followed when government
assistance was provided to Chrysler in 1980.
4. For CED’s recommendations for broadening unemployment compensation, see
American Workers and Economic Change (1996), pp. 51-53.
FISCAL POLICY IN RECESSION 
AND BEYOND
Stabilizing the Economy in the Short-Term
The physical destruction in New York and at the Pentagon and the
resulting economic disruption of transportation, travel, and other sec-
tors will not cause significant lasting damage to our economy, which is
remarkably resilient. But the impact of these unprecedented events on
consumer and business confidence and expectations is extremely
uncertain and could produce a large temporary decline in consump-
tion and investment expenditures.
Monetary policy has been, and will remain, our principal and most
flexible tool for stabilization policy. However, if the decline promises to
be large or prolonged, fiscal stimulus may also be required. It is there-
fore only prudent that we prepare to implement appropriate fiscal
measures to increase demand if they prove necessary.
However, if additional fiscal stimulus is required to moderate a
recession, it will present a dilemma requiring careful and adroit policy
management:
• On the one hand, the size of the fiscal year 2002 budget
surplus or deficit should not be a major determinant of
needed actions. The surplus will be sharply reduced by the
large, but temporary, decline in revenues resulting from a reces-
sion. Such a drop in the surplus during recession is desirable,
reflecting our “automatic stabilizers” at work.The additional
emergency spending already planned, plus any additional stimu-
5
lus measures, will further reduce the surplus, or push the budget
into deficit.These budget changes will support a weak economy.
• On the other hand, any fiscal stimulus must be temporary
and combined with a credible commitment to future bud-
get surpluses. If the decline in the 2002 budget surplus is seen
as a prelude to future budget deficits, long-term interest rates
will rise, undermining the effects of fiscal stimulus.
In addition to being temporary, any additional fiscal stimulus must
be timely and effectively targeted:
• Timely stimulus requires measures that can be implemented
quickly, such as a temporary reduction in payroll taxes, further
tax rebates, or reductions in allowable depreciation lives, to
reflect the rapid economic obsolescence of some equipment.
• Effectively targeted stimulus requires measures that are likely to
raise public or private expenditures quickly, such as emergency
expenditures under current programs or tax reductions or
income support for low- and middle-income individuals.
Ensuring Growth in the Longer Term 
Long-term growth provides the economic resources for both our
security and our living standards.The aging of our population and the
massive retirement of baby-boomers that will begin in 2008 will place
additional pressure on these resources. None of this has changed since
September 11. But our larger security needs, of uncertain size, will cre-
ate even greater competition for resources when the economy recov-
ers and returns to high employment. Unless longer-term fiscal policy is
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managed carefully, that competition could bring an acceleration of
inflation, higher long-term interest rates, and slower economic growth.
Some history is instructive. In the mid-1960s we failed to resolve
the conflict between escalating military expenditures for the Vietnam
War and domestic expenditures, both public and private.Total national
spending exceeded our productive capacity, but we did not offset 
the increased military spending with either sufficient cuts in other
public expenditures or tax increases to reduce private spending.As a
result, inflation accelerated, initiating a traumatic 15-year struggle to
restore price stability, as oil price shocks in the 1970s exacerbated 
the inflation.
We must not repeat this mistake. But avoiding inflation is not the
only issue.To meet our long-term objectives, we must maintain the
higher economic growth that began in the mid-1990s, which resulted
in large part from investments in new information technology.Those
investments, however, were catalyzed by pro-investment economic
policies—higher national saving from growing budget surpluses and
the lower interest rates that those surpluses made possible.
Strong economic growth will continue to require adequate national
saving and investment in spite of higher security expenditures.
Because of our chronically low private saving, adequate national saving
will inevitably require significant budget surpluses. Our long-term fis-
cal target therefore should be budget surpluses adequate to produce
the national saving required for vigorous growth—not merely bal-
ance in some measure of the budget deficit. These future surpluses
were already in jeopardy before September 11. Fortunately, the 
structure of the recently enacted tax cut allows us some policy flexi-
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bility, since many of its important changes will become effective only
in the future and can be reconsidered.
In this new policy environment, as our national security needs
become clearer, we will inevitably undertake a thorough reexamina-
tion of our long-term fiscal policy.As we do so, we should examine
carefully not only our budget priorities and the effectiveness of many
expenditure programs, but also our revenue policies as they affect
national saving, investment, and growth. Policies supporting long-term
growth will provide the strongest foundation for an economy large and
vital enough to provide both higher living standards and the capacity
to enhance security and stability, both at home and abroad.
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The Committee for Economic Development (CED) is an independent, nonpartisan
organization of over 200 business leaders and educators. CED is dedicated to poli-
cy research on major economic and social issues and implementation of its recom-
mendations by the public and private sectors.
CED was founded in 1942 to strengthen the relationship between business and 
government in the transition from war to peace. Economic Policy in a New
Environment: Five Principles grows out of this tradition and draws on CED’s long
history of developing economic policies that promote sound, long-term economic
growth and stability. It is designed to provide guidance to policy makers and citi-
zens as they make critical economic and national security decisions in new and
rapidly changing circumstances.
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